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Introduction
　Universal criminal jurisdiction(1) is the assertion of jurisdiction over 
⑴　The definition of universal jurisdiction varies among authors. Some define it in 
relation to the category of offence (piracy, genocide) or the nature of the offence 
(international crime). See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States, Vol. I (1985), at 254, §404; The Princeton Principle on Universal 
Jurisdiction (2001), at 28, Principle 1. Others define it in relations to the scope of the 
state that may exercise it (ʻevery stateʼ or ʻany stateʼ). See, Z. Galicki, ʻPreliminary 
Report on the Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare)ʼ, UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/571, 7 June 2006, para.19 ; K. Randall, ʻUniversal Jurisdiction Under Interna-
tional Lawʼ, 66 Texas Law Review (1988), at 788. The present study tries to avoid any 
preconceptions with regards to whether and how these elements are related to 
universal jurisdiction, which will be examined later, and prefers the definition focusing 
on the modality of exercising jurisdiction as presented above.
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conduct committed outside the territory of the state asserting jurisdiction 
over the actions of a national of another state against a national of another 
state. In other words, it is the assertion of jurisdiction over an act that has 
no link to the state exercising it in terms of the locus of the crime or the 
nationality of the offenders or victims.
　This category of jurisdiction began manifesting as a trend in the 1990s 
with regard to serious international crimes and grave violations of human 
rights. Behind this was a zeitgeist(2) that could be observed in the spirit of 
cooperation generated among great powers at the end of the Cold War, the 
phenomenon of globalization in various fields, and the re-emerged 
interventionism. This changing legal climate also led the international society 
to direct its attention towards the project of international criminal justice. 
Galvanised by the mass atrocities in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the project 
evolved into a global fight against impunityʼ,(3) which resulted in the 
establishment of international criminal tribunals, including the International 
Criminal Court, the first permanent criminal court in history.(4) Along with 
international criminal tribunals, universal jurisdiction has been perceived as 
one of the central apparatuses for promoting this ongoing project.
　This trend has also found supporters among states, with Belgium and 
Spain as the most notable forerunners. In 1993, Belgium enacted a law(5) 
implementing the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols(6) 
(the Geneva Conventions), in which a list of 20 acts constituting grave 
breaches of the Conventions and Protocols were designated as ʻcrimes under 
⑵　See L. Reydams, ʻThe Rise and Fall of Universal Jurisdictionʼ, in W. Schabas and N. 
Bernaz (eds), Handbook of International Criminal Law (2011), at 338.
⑶　This campaign was led mainly by NGOs. In this regard Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch are of particular importance. See, Amnesty International, 
Universal Jurisdiction: The Duty of States to Enact and Implement Legislation (2001), 
Index Number: IOR 53/017/2001; ibid., Universal Jurisdiction: Strengthening this 
Essential Tool of International Justice (2012), Index Number: IOR 53/020/2012. 
Human Rights Watch, Universal Jurisdiction in Europe: The State of the Art, Human 
Rights Watch Vol.18 No.5 (2006).
⑷　A. Cassese and P. Gaeta (eds), Casseseʼs International Criminal Law (3rd edn., 
2013), at 258.
⑸　Loi du 16 Juin 1993 relative à la répression des infractions graves aux conventions 
internationals de Genève du 12 août 1949 et aux protocols I et II du 8 juin 1988, 
additionales à ces conventions, Moniteur belge, 5 août 1993, at 17751.
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international law (crimes de droit international)ʼ and made punishable in 
accordance with the Act. The Act was later amended in 1999(7) (the 
amending legislation is hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1993/1999) to 
include genocide and crimes against humanity in the list. Described by 
commentators as ʻthe most progressive of its kindʼ,(8) the Act of 1993/1999 
not only established universal jurisdiction over the listed crimes, not all of 
which were subject to the principle of aut dedere aut judicare provided in the 
relevant treaties.(9) It also contained several rules that derogated from the 
general principles of criminal law, such as the inapplicability of any statute 
of limitations or amnesties and the rejection of immunity attached to an 
official capacity of a person. In addition, the Belgian criminal justice system 
adopted the mechanism of constitution de partie civile, by which a victim 
may trigger the opening of a preliminary investigation and commence 
⑹　Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field (First Convention), 75 UNTS 31; Convention for the Amelioration 
of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea 
(Second Convention), 75 UNTS 85; Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners 
of War (Third Convention), 75 UNTS 135; Convention relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Convention), 75 UNTS 287; Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol I), U.N. Doc. 
A/32/144 (15 August 1977); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed 
Conflicts (Additional Protocol II), U.N. Doc. A/32/144 (15 August 1977).
⑺　Loi du 10 février 1999 relative à la répression des violations graves du droit 
international humanitaire, Moniteur belge, 23 mars 1999, at 9286.
⑻　S. Smis and K. Van der Borght, ʻIntroductory Note to the Act Concerning the 
Punishment of Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law (10 Febrary 1999)ʼ, 
38 International Legal Material (1999), at 920.
⑼　The most notable was the fact that the ʻgrave breachesʼ to which the Act was 
applicable not only covered the crimes under the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and 
their Additional Protocol I, but also the Additional Protocol II. This meant that the 
scope of crimes subject to universal jurisdiction was extended to include violations of 
humanitarian law in non-international armed conflicts, which was not assumed in the 
regime of Geneva Conventions. In fact, pursuant to Articles 49 (First Convention), 50 
(Second Convention), 129 (Third Convention) and 146(Fourth Convention) of the Geneva 
Conventions and Article 85 §1 of Additional Protocol I, the term ʻgrave breachesʼ is 
only applicable to international armed conflicts. The violations of humanitarian law in 
non-international armed conflicts (Additional Protocol II) do not fall within the ambit of 
the undertaking referred to in the above mentioned articles.
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criminal proceedings in certain circumstances.(10) Many such complaints 
were brought under the Act of 1993/1999 before its amendment by the Act 
of 2003.(11) These acts were made against former as well as incumbent 
foreign heads of states, heads of governments, and other high officials.(12) 
One complaint actually resulted in the issuance of an arrest warrant to the 
incumbent foreign minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mr 
Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi.
　In 1985, Spain enacted the Organic Law of the Judicial Power (Ley 
Orgánica del Poder Judicial /LOPJ). Article 23(4) of this law empowered 
Spanish authorities to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate certain crimes 
including genocide,(13) even if these crimes had no connection with Spain. 
The only statutory limitation was that prosecution should not be pursued if 
the criminal has been acquitted, convicted, or pardoned abroad (Article 
23(2)(c)). Spanish universal jurisdiction received considerable international 
attention in October 1998, when a Spanish investigative judge issued an 
arrest warrant for Chileʼs former President, Augusto Pinochet, who was at 
the time visiting the United Kingdom. Following this high-profile case, 
Spanish tribunals dealt with a significant number of allegations concerning 
⑽　Victims may, by making him/herself a civil party, seize an investigating judge (juge 
dʼinstruction), if the public prosecutor in the exercise of his discretion decides not to 
prosecute or is still considering his/her position.
⑾　Loi modifiant law loi du 16 juin 1993 relative à la repression des violations graves du 
droit international humanitaire et lʼarticle 144ter du Code judiciaire, 23 avril 2003, 
Moniteur belge, 7 août 2003, at 40506.
⑿　They include: the Cuban President Fidel Castro, the Ivory Coast President Laurent 
Gbagbo, the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, the Rwandan President Paul Kagame, 
the Mauritanian President Maaouya Iuld SidʼAhmed Taya and the Israeli Prime 
Minister Ariel Sharon. See Smis and Van der Borght, supra note 8, at 743. Complaints 
were also made against former U.S. President George H. W. Bush, Vice President 
(and former Secretary of Defense) Dick Cheney, Secretary of State (and former 
chairman of the joint chiefs of staff) Colin Powell, and retired general Norman 
Schwarzkopf for allegedly committing war crimes during the 1991 Gulf war. See S. 
Ratner ʻBelgiumʼs War Crimes Statute: A Postmortemʼ, 97 American Journal of 
International Law (2003), at 889-891.
⒀　Those crimes are: (a)genocide; (b)terrorism; (c)sea or air piracy; (d)counterfeiting; 
(e)offences in connection with prostitution and corruption of minors and incompetents; 
(f)drug trafficking, (g)any other offence which Spain is obliged to prosecute under an 
international treaty or convention.
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international crimes in the exercise of universal jurisdiction(14) before 
retreating from the frontline after the amendment of Article 23(4) by the 
Organic Law 1/2009 of 3 November 2009.(15)
　At the same time, the promotion of universal jurisdiction required a 
theoretical innovation, especially in the period of its genesis. This assertion 
of jurisdiction not only lacked the jurisdictional links that traditional 
assertion of jurisdiction had, it also lacked grounding in the conventional 
regimes or customary law. On the one hand, some of the crimes subject to 
the assertion of universal jurisdiction had no corresponding conventional 
regime as such (crimes against humanity), or were not covered by the 
jurisdictional grounds provided by relevant conventional regimes (genocide(16) 
and a part of violation of humanitarian law(17)). On the other hand, state 
⒁　See E. C. Rojo, ʻNational Legislation Providing for the Prosecution and Punishment 
of International Crimes in Spainʼ, 9 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2011), at 
722-728.
⒂　Organic Law 1/2009 Complementary to the Law Reforming the Procedural Legislation 
for the Implementation of the New Judicial Office. The law, while adding crimes 
against humanity, illegal traffic or clandestine immigration of persons, and crimes 
related to female genital mutilation to the catalog of crimes covered by the principle of 
universality, made the exercise of jurisdiction subject to the following conditions: that 
the alleged perpetrators are present in Spain, that the victims are of Spanish nationality, 
or that there is some demonstrated relevant link to Spanish interests. In any case, the 
Spanish courts have no jurisdiction when other competent courts or international 
tribunals have begun proceedings that constitute an effective investigation and 
prosecution of these punishable acts. For an overview of the development toward the 
amendment, see de la Rasilla del Moral ʻThe Swan Song of Universal Jurisdiction in 
Spainʼ, 9 International Criminal Law Review (2009), at 802-805. See also, Rojo, supra 
note 14, at 713.
　　Most recently, it was reported that the arrest warrants were issued on 19 November 
2013 against Former Chinese president Jiang Zemin and ex prime minister Li Peng, for 
their alleged commission of genocide in Tibet. The case was brought by two Tibetan 
support groups and a monk with Spanish nationality, which allowed suspects to be tried 
under the Spanish law based on the victimʼs nationality. See ʻChinese leaders face Spain 
arrest warrant over Tibetʼ, available at
　http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/19/us-china-tibet-spain-idUSBRE9AI0XA20131119 
(as of 31 October 2014).
⒃　Article VI of the Genocide Convention refers only to a competent tribunal of territorial 
state and international penal tribunals as a venue for the trial of genocide.
⒄　See footnote 9 for the Belgian Act 1993/1999ʼs dealing with the violation of humanitarian 
law in non-international armed conflicts.
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practices were either scarce or inconsistent,(18) which would not be sufficient 
for a customary rule to be confirmed.
　There are mainly two approaches that seek to overcome this scarcity of 
state practice. The first one emphasizes the nature of crimes that are 
targeted by the assertion of universal jurisdiction and seeks to deduce a 
jurisdictional ground for universal jurisdiction from the very nature of the 
crimes (deductive approach). The second one is more in line with traditional 
scholarship and seeks to establish a customary rule which provides a ground 
for universal jurisdiction (inductive approach); at the same time it applies 
less strict conditions in one way or another in confirming customary rules 
than required in traditional view.
　While both approaches may capture some aspects of jurisdiction, they are 
without problems. By critically examining these two approachesʼ significance 
and drawbacks, this article seeks a way to overcome a dichotomy of 
deductive and inductive approaches, which will lead to a more workable 
framework of jurisdiction.
1. The Deductive Approach
　1.1. Piracy as an Analogy
　One of the viewpoints that support deducing the basis of universal 
jurisdiction from the nature of a crime makes an analogy of piracy. In light 
of pirates being historically referred to as hostis humani generis (ʻenemy of 
mankindʼ), and the fact that any state can seize them on the high seas and 
bring them to trial before their domestic court, this view argues that the 
exercise of jurisdiction over persons who have committed a crime with no 
direct link with the prosecuting state can be justified by the heinousness of 
the crime in question.(19)
　However, it seems inadequate to infer the nature of crime from the term 
hostis humani generis. The view that refers to pirates as hostis humani 
generis dates back to ancient Rome, a time when the term ʻpiratesʼ was 
⒅　L. Reydams, Universal Jurisdiction (2003), at 223-224.
⒆　S. Macedo, ʻIntroductionʼ, in S. Macedo (ed), Universal Jurisdiction (2003), at 4. 
See also F. A. Mann, ʻThe Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Lawʼ, 11 Recueil 
des Cours, 1964-I, at 95; Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F. 2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); 
Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 1985).
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used primarily in reference to political communities in the Eastern 
Mediterranean.(20) Although these pirates attacked other vessels without 
any Roman-style declaration of war, they were still regarded as an agent of 
ʻwarʼ for which the law of war was applicable. They were referred to as 
hostis, which made them distinct from criminals under Roman law.(21) 
Additionally, these communities were in an enduring state of war against 
neighbouring states due to this non-declaration of war. Thus formulated, 
this term was originally used to indicate a common belligerent to people in 
Rome and its allies, and accordingly it did not carry any connotation 
associated with the nature of the crime. Although the term hostis humani 
generis survived in the course of the later development in the conceptualiza-
tion of piracy, it has lost substance and has gradually become subordinate 
to the concept of acts of piracy.(22)
　As for the concept of acts of piracy itself, the scale of activity ranged 
from mere theft to massive battles throughout the history of piracy until the 
19th century, and not all acts of piracy were regarded to be as heinous as 
genocide or other serious international crimes. Additionally, they could not 
be indiscriminately subject to universal jurisdiction. Indeed, via a gradual 
process and by the 19th century, acts of piracy had gradually been 
conceptualized as being subject to the exercise of universal jurisdiction. The 
justification for it was not based on the nature of the crime, but was to be 
found in the fact piracy was committed on the high seas and ʻunder 
conditions that render it impossible or unfair to hold any state responsible 
for its commissionʼ.(23) In other words, the grounds for justifying universal 
⒇　A. P. Rubin, The Law of Piracy, (2nd edn., 1997), at 16.
　Ibid., at 16-19.
　In fact, in In re Piracy Jure Gentium [1934] A.C. 586 which has often been cited as 
a precedent denouncing acts of piracy as ʻhostis humani generisʼ, the Privy Council did 
not use that label to mean that an act of piracy was of particularly heinous nature. 
Actually, act in question was merely a robbery, and according to the Privy Council, 
recognition of them as constituting crimes was left to the municipal law of each 
country. It was rather submitted that the criminal jurisdiction of municipal law would 
be extended to piracy committed on the high seas by any national on any ship, ʻbecause 
a person guilty of such piracy has placed himself beyond the protection of any Stateʼ.
　W.E. Hall, A Treatise on International Law (8th edn., 1924), at 310-311. See also, 
W.E. Beckett, ʻThe Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction over Foreignersʼ, 6 British 
Yearbook of International Law (1925), at 45.
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jurisdiction over acts of piracy in the 19th century was based on the fact 
that pirates were not under the authority and protection of any state, 
rather than the gravity or nature of the crime itself.(24) In fact, similar 
depredations were conducted by privateers who had first obtained a license 
from a state (a letter of marque), but these were not regarded as acts of 
piracy by virtue of the permission given by the state.(25)
　Given the points set out above, the exercise of universal jurisdiction over 
pirates in the 19th century was based on two rationales: first, that 
enforcement took place on the high seas and beyond the reach of any 
sovereign; and second, that enforcement occurred on a subject that was not 
under the protection of any state. In other words, as it was built on the fact 
that the exercise of jurisdiction over pirates would not be in conflict with 
any other stateʼs claim, it was therefore not based on the nature of the 
crime itself.(26) The structure of such an exercise of jurisdiction was later 
adopted in the provisions for the repression of piracy under the Convention 
on the High Seas and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea(27) (UNCLOS). Both conventions provide two requirements for illegal 
acts of violence, detention, or depredation to constitute an act of piracy: 
first, the act was committed on the high seas, against another ship or 
aircraft in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state; and second, the act 
was committed for private ends by the crew of a private ship or a private 
aircraft (Article 15 of the Convention on the High Seas,(28) Article 101 of 
UNCLOS). It should be noted that due to this formulation, the exercise of 
jurisdiction over an act of piracy would not coincide with the claim of 
another state.(29) This by no means denies that the interest protected by the 
repression of piracy － namely, the security of maritime transportation － is 
an interest common to all nations. In fact, the common interest of nations 
　G. H. Hackworth, Digest of International Law, Vol. II (1941), at 681.
　Hall, supra note 23, at 317. Actually the remedy was obtained from the State issued 
a letter of marque when the privateer acted beyond the extent of permission.
　E. Kontorovich (2004), ʻThe Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdictionʼs Hollow 
Foundationʼ, 45 Harvard International Law Journal (2004), at 183. See also, A. Addis 
(2009), ʻImagining the International Community: The Constitutive Dimension of 
Universal Jurisdictionʼ, 31 Human Rights Quarterly (2009), at 129.
　1833 UNTS 3.
　450 UNTS 11.
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became more clearly acknowledged(30) with regard to the repression of 
piracy after the demise of privateers and their authorised attacks on the 
merchant vessels of other nations,(31) which consequently nullified the need 
to distinguish between permissible private depredations and acts of piracy. 
However, it should be recognized that even under modern international law 
in which such common interest is acknowledged, the structure of the 
exercise of jurisdiction remains unchanged; i.e. the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction is accepted when there is no concurrence with another stateʼs 
claim.
　1.2. The Jus Cogens Nature of Crimes
　Another view based on the nature of crime relies on the concept of jus 
cogens. This view is premised on the recognition of values shared by the 
international community, which cannot be reduced to the interests or values 
of individual states.(32) The jus cogens norm is regarded as embodying such 
collective value interest,(33) and accordingly, it is alleged that all states as 
members of international community are entitled to punish conduct that 
violates jus cogens norms.(34)
　At the outset, it is necessary to clarify the concept of jus cogens and its 
role and context in the existing international legal system. While the 
literature of the pre-WWII era made references to the concept,(35) it was the 
　Since a vessel engaging in an act of piracy does not automatically lose its nationality 
(Article 18 of the Convention on the High Seas, Article 104 of UNCLOS), it is not 
appropriate to equate a pirate ship with a ship without nationality (Cf. G. 
Schwarzenberger ʻThe Problem of an International Criminal Lawʼ, 3 Current Legal 
Problems (1950), at 269.) Rather, it should be submitted that the certain kind of act 
for which the flag state would not be willing to claim its exclusive jurisdiction had been 
historically established as an act of ʻpiracyʼ which is subjected to the universal jurisdiction 
and was later adopted in the international agreements.
　Harvard Research, ʻJurisdiction with Respect to Crimeʼ, 29 American Journal of 
International Law, Supplement (1935), at 566.
　The Declaration on the Abolishment of Privateers was adopted in 1856, and it was 
observed that the practice of privateers became obsolete by the early 20th Century. L. 
Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) in International Law: Historical 
Development, Criteria, Present Status (1988), at 71.
　B. Simma, ʻFrom Bilateralism toward Community Interestʼ, 250 Recueil des Cours 
(1994), at 286-293; Hannikainen, supra note 31, at 4.
　Hannikainnen, ibid., at 2.
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Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties(36) (VCLT) that introduced the 
concept of jus cogens to the realm of positive international law. Article 53 of 
the Convention defines jus cogens as ʻa norm accepted and recognised by the 
international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no 
derogation is permittedʼ and ʻa treaty is void if it conflicts with a peremptory 
normʼ.
　The significance of the concept of jus cogens thus formulated should not 
be underestimated. Its power to invalidate an agreement is premised on 
－ and indeed cannot be explained without － the existence of a certain 
public order. This can be well understood by comparing the proposition of 
Fitzmaurice and that of Waldock, both of whom were serving as special 
rapporteurs in the International Law Commission (ILC) for the work on the 
codification of the law of treaties. Fitzmaurice postulated that the mutual 
consent of the parties was an essential condition for the validity of any 
treaty. Thus, while observing the nature of jus cogens as ʻabsolute and 
imperativeʼ, he submitted that a treaty which was in conflict with jus cogens 
norms could only become unenforceable between parties, as there was no 
flaw with respect to their mutual consent.(37) In contrast, Waldock 
postulated a certain legal order － imperfect though it might be in Waldockʼs 
own words － from which states could not at their own free will contract 
out.(38) A jus cogens norm is regarded as embodying such an order, and as 
such it makes a treaty void when the latter is in conflict with it. Note that 
Waldockʼs view was reflected in the provisions of the VCLT.
　Conceptualized in this manner, the notion of jus cogens has been regarded 
　M. Cherif Bassiouni, ʻUniversal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical 
Perspectives and Contemporary Practiceʼ, 42 Virginia Journal of International Law 
(2001-2002), at 107; A. Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law (2006), 
at 288; A. Addis, ʻImagining the International Community: The Constitutive Dimension 
of Universal Jurisdictionʼ, 31 Human Rights Quarterly (2009), at 142-144.
　D. Shelton, ʻNormative Hierarchy in International Lawʼ, 100 American Journal of 
International Law (2006), at 297-299.
　1155 UNTS 331.
　G. Fitzmaurice, ʻThird Report of the Law of Treatiesʼ, Yearbook of the International 
Law Commission, 1958 Vol. II, at 25, 27-28, 40.
　H. Waldock, ʻSecond Report of the Law of Treatiesʼ, Yearbook of the International 
Law Commission, 1963 Vol. II, at 39, 52.
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as embodying a certain public order that cannot be reduced to the will of 
individual states, thus going beyond the scope of application of treaty law. 
Accordingly, jus cogens has been understood as having a function that 
prohibits acts that infringe on the values which it intends to protect.(39) 
Based on this assumption, doctrines have sought to identify the special 
effect of violations of jus cogens norms and how jus cogens are to be situated 
in the international legal system, premised on that violation of such rules 
that serve for the maintenance of the public order must be dealt with 
differently from that of ordinary rules.(40)
　In the field of international criminal law, this special effect is succinctly 
illustrated by the oft-cited passage of the Furundžija case in the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). After observing that 
the prohibition of torture is a norm of jus cogens that enjoys ʻa higher rank 
in the international hierarchyʼ,(41) the Trial Chamber added:
Furthermore, at the individual level, that is, that of criminal liability it 
would seem that one of the consequences of the jus cogens character 
bestowed by the international community upon the prohibition of torture 
is that every State is entitled to investigate, prosecute and punish or 
extradite individuals accused of torture who are present in a territory 
under its jurisdiction. Indeed, it would be inconsistent on the one hand to 
prohibit torture to such an extent as to restrict the normally unfettered 
treaty-making power of sovereign States and on the other hand bar States 
from prosecuting and punishing those torturers who have engaged in this 
odious practice abroad.(42)
　Hannnikainen, supra note 31, at 9; J. Crawford, The International Law Commissionʼs 
Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries (2002), at 246 
(Article 40, Commentary (3)).
　No doubt the distinction between international crimes and ordinary international 
wrongs in the field of state responsibility that had been introduced by the ILC is the 
most discussed issue in this regard. While the notion of ʻinternational crimeʼ was not 
included as such in the Article on State Responsibility finally adopted, the distinction 
between the jus cogens (peremptory) norms and any other rules was retained, the 
serious violation of the former being attached special consequences.
　Prosecutor v. Furundžija, IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 10 December 
1998, para. 153.
�　Ibid., para.156.
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However, it is not clear from this statement how the power of jus cogens to 
restrict ʻthe treaty-making power of sovereign statesʼ, in which an 
addressee seems to be a state,(43) may also serve to authorize the exercise of 
criminal jurisdiction by other states over an individual who acted in violation 
of the norm. To put it another way, there are two distinct questions 
relevant here: whether － and how － an individual can be an addressee of 
jus cogens norms; and, if so, whether this will entail every stateʼs entitlement 
to punish. These questions are addressed in order below.
　　1.2.1. Can Individual be an Addressee of Jus Cogens Norms?
　In order to address the first question, it is necessary to begin by asking 
whether an individual can be an addressee of the rules of international law, 
the scope of which include jus cogens norms. If so, how is the basis for an 
individual addressee of jus cogens to be established? In this regard, it should 
be recalled that under the classical doctrine, it was assumed that only a 
state could be held liable at international law and responsibility of 
individuals remained a matter of domestic law.(44) This principle negates the 
very capability of an individual to be an addressee of international duties. 
However, the post-WWII prosecution of war leaders at the International 
Military Tribunals (IMTs) set a precedent that international law could 
impose duties on individuals directly, with regard to crimes against peace, 
crimes against humanity, and war crimes. It also suggested that these 
individuals would not be immune from their responsibility due to the fact 
that they were acting on behalf of the states they belonged to.(45) These 
　Admittedly, the Trial Chamber in Furundžija seems to assume that it is individuals 
that are an addressee of jus cogens prohibition. However, it requires further clarification, 
since as far as the restriction of treaty-making power of states is concerned, an 
addressee of ʻno derogationʼ from jus cogens is states.
　A. Bianchi, ʻState Responsibility and Criminal Liability of Individualsʼ, in A. Cassese 
(ed.), The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (2009), at 17.
　The oft-cited statement of the International Military Tribunals succinctly but eloquently 
illustrated the rational: ʻCrimes against international law are committed by men, not by 
abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the 
provision of international law be enforcedʼ. Trial of the Major War Criminals before the 
International Military Tribunal, Vol. I (1947), at 223.
　Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1950, Vol. II, at 374.
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propositions were later confirmed by the Formulation of Nurnberg Principles 
prepared by the International Law Commission (ILC).(46)
　It is important to note that before these prosecutions by the IMTs, the 
three categories of crimes had had only an ambiguous or even non-existent 
status on the international plane. As for war crimes, while states had 
customarily punished nationals of belligerent states for acts committed 
before capture, there was no consensus among commentators on whether 
it was done in direct application of international customary law, or domestic 
laws of a state of the prisoner, or a custodial state. The Formulation of 
Nurnberg Principles had thereby the effect of endorsing their status as 
crimes under international law. As for crimes against humanity, elements 
of crimes constituting them (murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation and other inhuman acts) had already been criminalised in many 
municipal legal systems, but they were unknown to international law as 
such. Thus, the Formulation served to legitimise the concept within the 
realm of international law.(47) In contrast, crimes against peace as a crime 
for individuals had been unknown both to international and domestic law 
before World War II (WWII). Commentators thus observed that the 
Charters of the IMTs were the application of ex post facto law.(48) While the 
implication of the confirmation of status of these crimes thus varies from one 
category to another depending on the place that they had had before, the 
significance of the precedent laid down by the IMTs and the Formulation 
lies in the fact that it elevated these three categories of crimes into the 
international level, by labelling them ʻcrimes under international lawʼ, for 
which individuals could be held responsible directly under international law.
　However, this precedent did not necessarily mean that ʻcrimes under 
international lawʼ became firmly established within the realm of positive 
international law. For such a concept to be entrenched, not only must 
substantive norms have direct binding force on individuals in the absence of 
　R. Cryer, ʻThe Doctrinal Foundations of International Criminalizationʼ, in M. Cherif 
Bassiouni (ed.), International Criminal Law, Vol.1: Sources, Subjects, and Contents 
(3rd edn., 2008), at 120.
　B. V. A. Röling and A. Cassase, The Tokyo Trial and Beyond (1993), at 3-5; K. 
S. Gallant, The Principle of Legality in International and Comparative Criminal law 
(2008), at 115-116.
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intermediate provisions of municipal law being established on the international 
plane, but the corresponding procedure must also be available in the form 
of an international criminal court, or if before a municipal court, in accordance 
with the principle of universal jurisdiction.(49) Moreover, those regimes 
establishing individual liability would have to be binding on the great 
majority of states, for ʻonly then would the international status of the 
relevant penal provision be assuredʼ.(50) In light of this, the precedent of the 
IMTs and the Formulation could be seen as validating the existence of those 
substantive norms,(51) yet those norms remained to be complemented by the 
corresponding procedure, because the character of those tribunals as truly 
international courts was highly questionable.(52) As the discussion below will 
show, the practice during the Cold War era demonstrated that the 
international society had not been united enough to provide the procedure 
and judicial entities for this purpose. The question of the capability of 
individuals to be addressees of international duties, therefore, had remained 
unresolved during that era.
　The most notable example of this lack of resolution can be observed in the 
procedure in practice for the punishment of crimes of genocide. The 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crimes of Genocide(53) 
(Genocide Convention) (1948) declares genocide as a crime under international 
　H.-H. Jescheck (1985), ʻInternational Crimesʼ, 8 Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law (1985), at 333. See also P. Gaeta, ʻInternational Criminalization of Prohibited 
Conductʼ, in A. Cassese (ed.), Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice 
(2009), at 63 (arguing that certain conduct is criminalized not only if that conduct is 
prohibited by law, but also if the threat of a criminal sanction is attached to it in case 
of transgression).
　Jescheck, ibid., at 333.
　K. Parlett, The Individual in the International Legal System (2011), at 258, 274-
277 (arguing that the Nuremberg Principles were a strong indication that individuals 
could be held responsible directly under international law for certain violations of 
international law, while admitting that jurisdiction to enforce was absent around that 
time).
　Both judges and prosecutors were appointed by each of the victor Powers, the latter 
even being acted under the instruction of each appointing state. Therefore, it is argued 
that ʻthe two military Tribunals were not independent international courts proper, but 
judicial bodies acting as organs common to the appointing statesʼ. Cassese and Gaeta, 
supra note 4, at 257-258.
　78 UNTS 277.
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law (Article I), and also designates an international penal tribunal along 
with a tribunal of territorial state as a venue for it to be tried (Article VI), 
which is observed by commentators as reflecting ʻthe truly international 
legal character of the crimeʼ.(54) However, the Convention does not expressly 
refer to individual obligations but rather imposes obligations on states to 
give effect to the prohibition in domestic law. More importantly, an attempt 
to establish an international criminal court soon became stymied,(55) and 
indeed the prosecution of crimes of genocide at the international level did not 
take place until the 1990s. As for universal jurisdiction, it was not included 
in the Convention: an Iranian proposal to introduce universal jurisdiction(56) 
met with strenuous objection especially from major powers(57) and was 
eventually rejected.(58) While the chief reason of the objection was not that 
the exercise of universal jurisdiction would be in breach of international 
law,(59) this example succinctly illustrates the lack of will among states 
around the time to establish a procedure that would adequately match the 
status of crimes of genocide as ʻcrimes under international lawʼ.
　B. Simma and P. Alston, ʻThe Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, 
and General Principles, 12 Australian Year Book of International Law (1999), at 308.
　The ILC was referred to work on the prospect of establishing an international 
criminal court in 1948, and it produced the Draft Statutes in 1951 and 1953 (Report of 
the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, UN Doc. A/2136 and Report of 
the 1953 Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, UN Doc. A/2638). However, 
work was deferred pending the adoption of a definition of aggression and was only 
referred back to the ILC in 1989 (GA Res. 44/39, 4 December 1989). It was only in 
1994 that the Draft Statute was finally adopted.
　UN GAOR, 6th Comm., 3d Sess. (1948), UN Doc. A/C.6/218, Annexes, at 20. It 
was proposed that a custodial state would be conferred a right, hence not a duty, to try 
an alleged perpetrator provided no request had been made.
　UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.100 (USA), at 398-399 (arguing that at that stage of development 
of international law, it was dangerous to extend the jurisdiction of national courts to 
include the punishment of offences committed on the territory of others); UN Doc. A/
C.6/SR.100 (USSR), at 403 (arguing that the territorial state where documents and 
witnesses are found ʻwould not consent to surrender its penal jurisdiction to another 
Stateʼ, being ʻjealous of its sovereigntyʼ).
　UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.100, at 406.
　Rather, concern was made over the lack of impartiality of the national courts of a 
state in trying other statesʼ leaders. See UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.100 (Afghanistan), at 
397; UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.100 (Egypt), at 398; UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.100 (Uruguay), at 
398.
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　The procedure used in the context of war crimes requires a distinct 
examination, because the Geneva Conventions adopted in the same era 
mandate the High Contracting Parties to establish and exercise universal 
jurisdiction over ʻgrave breachesʼ of the Conventions.(60) While there is little 
doubt that it is ʻthe first treaty-based embodiment of an unconditional 
universal jurisdiction applicable to all states partiesʼ,(61) the question here is 
whether those grave breaches were meant to be ʻcrimes under international 
lawʼ, which would directly bind individual perpetrators to international 
norms. Regarding this, it is useful to analyse the relevant provisions in light 
of the travaux préparatoire.
　The International Committee of the Red Crossʼ (ICRC) proposals submitted 
to the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949 endorsed a relationship 
between the international character of crimes and the universality of 
jurisdiction. The proposal stated that ʻgrave breaches of the Convention 
shall be punished as crimes against the law of nations by the tribunals of any 
of the High Contracting Parties or by any international jurisdiction, the 
competence of which has been recognised by themʼ.(62) It argued that the 
principle of the universality of jurisdiction was adopted for the purpose of 
repressing such acts,(63) the immunity of which would lead to ʻthe degradation 
　Article 49 of the First Geneva Convention, Article 50 of the Second, Article 129 of 
the Third and Article 146 of the Forth oblige the High Contracting Parties ʻto enact any 
legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or 
ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches of [the] Convention defined in the 
following Articleʼ. Each Article goes on commonly to provide: ʻEach High Contracting 
Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or 
to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, 
regardless of their nationality, before its own courtsʼ.
　R. OʼKeefe, ʻThe Grave Breaches Regime and Universal Jurisdictionʼ, 7 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice (2009), at 811. In this regard, although only the nationality 
of the offender is mentioned as being irrelevant for the exercise of jurisdiction, it is 
implied that other jurisdictional grounds are also irrelevant. In fact, when the Italian 
Delegate proposed to limit the obligation of searching for alleged perpetrators and 
bringing them to justice to the Parties to the conflict, the Netherlands Delegate answered 
that each Contracting Party should be under this obligation, even if neutral in a conflict, 
hence the principle of universality being applied here. Italian proposal was finally 
withdrawn. See Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva, Vol.2-B (1949), 
at 116.
　ICRC, Remarks and Proposals (1949), at 18.
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of human personality and a diminished sense of human worthʼ.(64)
　Nevertheless, these proposals faced with strong objections from the 
commencement of the Diplomatic Conference, and the Netherlands 
Delegation, which had first tried to give the proposals the chance of being 
discussed, decided to submit a new text made in collaboration with the 
delegations that had raised objections.(65) In this new text, which would 
become the basis of the provisions finally adopted at the Conference, the 
term ʻcrimes against the law of nationsʼ that had originally characterised the 
concept of ʻgrave breachesʼ was dropped. In addition, there was no longer 
any reference to international jurisdiction.(66)
　The intention not to vest the term ʻgrave breachesʼ with the status of 
crime under international law was further illustrated by the explanation of 
the Netherlands Delegate, in their answer to the USSR Delegate who 
proposed replacing the word breachesʼ with ʻcrimesʼ:
...The Conference is not making international penal law but is 
undertaking to insert in the national penal laws certain acts enumerated 
as grave breaches of the Convention, which will become crimes when 
they have been inserted in the national penal laws.(67)
According to the Netherland Delegate, the inclusion of grave breaches 
would guarantee a certain amount of uniformity in the national laws, which 
was desirable as tribunals were also dealing with accused parties who were 
of other nationalities.(68) Given all this, although the laws and customs of war 
embodied in the Conventions had been established as the rules to be 
observed, ʻgrave breachesʼ of the Conventions were not regarded as 
directly imposing obligations on individuals.
　Ibid., at 21.
　Ibid., at 20.
　Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva, Vol.2-B (1949), at 115. These 
delegations were Australia, Belgium, Brazil, France, Italy, Norway, United Kingdom, 
United States of America and Switzerland.
　Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva, Vol.3 (1949), at 42-43.
　Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva, Vol.2-B (1949), at 116. The 
USSRʼs proposal was rejected.
　Ibid., at 115.
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　In short, the Genocide Convention and the Geneva Conventions that were 
adopted immediately after the WWII failed to consolidate ʻcrime under 
international lawʼ within the realm of positive international law, thereby 
rendering ambiguous the issue of whether individuals could be an addressee 
of international norms, not to mention jus cogens prohibitions. In fact, 
before the 1990s, most of the treaty practice in terms of international 
criminal law had taken place within the field of transnational criminal law, 
of which the suppression treaties are the typical examples. These treaties 
(and customary rules, if any) imposed obligations on states to criminalize 
certain conducts and enforce transgressions within their own legal orders.(69) 
It is important to note that the main feature of transnational criminal law is 
that international legal obligations are imposed on states, rather than 
individuals. As Cryer states, ʻthe essence of these offences is that the locus 
of the criminal prohibition on individuals is not the international legal order, 
but the municipal law of the State that prosecutesʼ.(70) In light of this, many 
of the alleged ʻcrimes under international lawʼ could in fact be categorized as 
crimes in the transnational criminal law, at least within the context they 
were dealt with during the Cold War era(71): Genocide and apartheid(72) 
without the establishment of international criminal tribunals may fit into this 
category; grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions in light of the drafters 
intention mentioned above demonstrates a feature of transnational criminal 
law; and as for crimes of torture, the Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment(73) (Convention 
Against Torture) remains faithful to the formula of suppression treaties.
　Things had started changing at the conclusion of the Cold War. Faced 
　N. Boister (2003), “ʻTransnational Criminal Law”?ʼ, 14 European Journal of 
International Law (2003), at 963.
　Cryer, supra note 47, at 109.
　Gaeta, supra note 49, at 64.
　Article V of the Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of 
Apartheid provides: ʻPersons charged with the acts enumerated in article II of the 
present Convention may be tried by a competent tribunal of any State Party to the 
Convention which may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused or by an 
international penal tribunal having jurisdiction with respect to those States Parties 
which shall have accepted its jurisdictionʼ.
　1465 UNTS 85.
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with the human atrocities in the conflicts that had erupted in the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the UN Security Council set up two ad hoc 
International Criminal Tribunals that became the first truly international 
tribunals; one tribunal was established for the former Yugoslavia in 1993 and 
another for Rwanda in 1994. The creation of these tribunals provided a vital 
starting point for the subsequent establishment of the International Criminal 
Court in 1998, and it also paved the way for the establishment of a group of 
ʻhybridʼ tribunals founded after 2000. It is important to note that the 
subject-matter jurisdiction of these tribunals generally includes crimes of 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. These are crimes for 
which individual perpetrators are to be prosecuted and punished. The 
significance of their creation, therefore, was to provide a means of 
enforcing those criminal prohibitions at the international level, thereby 
consolidating the notion of ʻcrime under international lawʼ for which 
individuals could be held responsible directly.(74)
　In sum, there is little doubt today that there are international norms that 
directly impose obligations upon individuals, of which genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes are the clearly accepted and recognized 
examples. It should be noted that the concept of ʻcrimes under international 
lawʼ does not connote that they are vested with the character of jus cogens.(75) 
Nevertheless, various tribunals, especially international or quasi-international 
criminal tribunals, have started affirming the peremptory nature of those 
crimes,(76) thereby contributing not only to the identification of jus cogens 
norms, but also to confirming that individuals could certainly be an addressee 
　Parlett, supra note 51, at 277 (arguing that individual responsibility for international 
crimes has been affirmed by international prosecutions, while submitting that individual 
criminal responsibility exist absent jurisdiction to enforce).
　Its underlying rational is, at least originally, not the nature of the interest to be 
protected, but the reality that it is individuals, not abstract entities, that committed a 
crime and ʻonly by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provision of 
international law be enforcedʼ. Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International 
Military Tribunal, Vol. I (1947), at 223.
　Prosecutor v. Furundžija, IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 10 December 
1998, para. 153 (torture); Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al. IT-95-16, Trial Chamber II, 
Judgment, 14 January 2000, para. 520 (genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes).
岡　法（64―２)
19
370
???
of those norms (individualization of jus cogens(77)).
　　1.2.2.  Can the Entitlement of Universal Jurisdiction be Deduced from 
Jus Cogens Norms?
　Having confirmed that individuals can be addressees of jus cogens norms, 
the focus of the discussion now turns to the second question: whether the 
entitlement to universal jurisdiction can be deduced from the violation of 
those norms.
　At the outset, it is necessary to make a brief observation on the distinction 
between substantive rules and procedural rules in the sphere of international 
law.(78) Despite the strenuous objection from some commentators,(79) this 
distinction has been retained in the proceedings before various courts, and 
is of particular importance in assessing the relation between the violation of 
jus cogens norms and the consequences it may entail. Basically, substantive 
rules are the rules that determine whether conduct is lawful or unlawful.(80) 
Those rules prescribe rights, obligations, and standards of conduct; 
determine legal status, title, and conditions; and provide legal definitions. 
On the other hand, procedural rules, or rules that in the ICJʼs words are 
ʻprocedural in natureʼ,(81) are defined as the rules that govern the means to 
effectuate the contents of substantive rules. As such, they are made up of 
rules governing the jurisdiction of courts and tribunals, including rules on 
the immunity from jurisdiction in both criminal and civil proceedings, and 
　T. Mogami, ʻPrologue to the Theory of Universal Jurisdictionʼ [in Japanese], S. Shigeki 
Sakamoto (ed.), Current Issues of International Lawmaking: Festschrift in honour of 
Professor Hisakazu Fujitaʼs 70th Birthday (2009), at 23.
　On the substantive-procedural distinction, S. Talmon, ʻJus Cogens after Germany v. 
Italy: Substantive and Procedural Rules Distinguishedʼ, 25 Leiden Journal of International 
Law (2012), at 981-982.
　A. Orakhelashvili, ʻState Immunity and Hierarchy of Norms: Why the House of 
Lords Got It Wrongʼ, 18 European Journal of International Law (2007), at 968; ibid., 
ʻThe Classification of International Legal Rules: A Reply to Stefan Talmonʼ, 26 Leiden 
Journal of International Law (2013), at 94. See also, Jurisdictional Immunities of the 
State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervention), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cançado 
Trindade, ICJ Reports 2012, at 285-286 (paras. 294-297).
　Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervention), 
Judgment of 3 February 2012, ICJ Reports 2012, at 124, 140 (paras. 58, 93).
　Ibid, at 124, (para. 58).
Beyond Dichotomy between Deduction and Induction
20
369
???
rules on the admissibility of a claim or application.
　In light of this distinction, the assertion that the entitlement of universal 
jurisdiction derived from the peremptory nature of the violated norms can 
be understood to imply that substantive jus cogens norms necessarily entail 
corresponding procedures that can effectuate the special nature of those 
norms.
　In this regard, it can be observed that generally, and not confined to the 
field of international criminal law, prohibition of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and torture have been affirmed as having a peremptory 
character in a number of recent cases in both international(82) and domestic 
courts.(83) Despite this, whether such substantial rules entail corresponding 
procedure is not self-evident. In fact, those very courts that recognized 
that the norms at issue were peremptory also refused to recognise specific 
effects that were alleged to be attached to the peremptory nature of those 
norms. For instance, in the Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo,(84) 
the ICJ recognized that the prohibition of genocide was assuredly of 
peremptory nature, but went on to state that the fact that a dispute related 
to the non-compliance with that norm could not of itself provide a basis for 
the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain that dispute. According to the 
court, ʻjurisdiction is always based on the consent of the partiesʼ under the 
Statute of the Court.(85) In other words, the fact that the violation of 
peremptory norms is at issue does not confer itself the jurisdiction to 
　Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic 
Republic of Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment of 3 February 
2006, ICJ Reports 2006, at 31-32 (para. 64) (genocide); Obligation to Prosecute or 
Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), ICJ Reports 2012, at 457 (para. 99) (torture); Al-Adsani 
v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 35763/97, Judgment, 21 November 2001, para. 
61 (torture).
　Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 715 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(genocide, enslavement, and other inhuman acts); Re Pinochet, Court of First 
Instance of Brussels, 6 November 1998, 119 International Law Reports 346, at 356 
(crimes against humanity); Ferrini v. Germany, Italian Court of Cassation (Plenary 
session), No. 5044 of 11 March 2004, 128 International Law Reports 658 (international 
humanitarian law).
　Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic 
Republic of Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility Judgment of 3 February 
2006, ICJ Reports 2006, at 6.
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entertain the dispute that it would not otherwise have had. In the 
Al-Adsani,(86) the European Court of Human Rights observed that despite 
the special jus cogens nature of the prohibition of torture, no rule has yet 
been established to the effect that, when acts of torture are alleged to have 
been committed by a state, the state in question may not enjoy immunity 
from civil suit in the courts of another state.(87) The Court thereby rejected 
the argument that the peremptory nature of the prohibition of torture would 
affect the principle pertaining to immunity established under customary 
international law. This rational was echoed in the Jurisdictional Immunity 
of the State case(88) with a more detailed argument. In this case, the ICJ 
observed that there is no conflict between a rule of jus cogens and the rules 
on state immunity, because they address different matters. The rules on 
state immunity, as a rule that is procedural in nature, are neutral to the 
question of whether or not the conduct in respect of which the proceedings 
are brought is lawful or unlawful(89); rather, they concern the conditions for 
proceedings to be brought, and hence necessarily precede the determination 
of the lawfulness of the conduct in question.(90) If there is no conflict, there 
is no prospect of a jus cogens rule affecting a rule on immunity with its 
　Ibid., at 31-32, 52, (paras. 64, 125). Similarly, the Court had already declared in 
East Timor that the right of self-determinationʼs erga omnes character, which is also 
related to the idea of the protection of the interest of international community, does not 
affect the rule of consent to jurisdiction. It provides: ʻThe Court considers that the erga 
omnes character of a norm and the rule of consent to jurisdiction are two different 
things. Whatever the nature of the obligations invoked, the Court could not rule on the 
lawfulness of the conduct of a State when its judgment would imply an evaluation of the 
lawfulness of the conduct of another State which is not a party to the case. Where this 
is so, the Court cannot act, even if the right in question is a right erga omnesʼ. Case 
Concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, 30 June 1995, ICJ Reports 
1995, at 102 (para. 29).
　Al-Adsani v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 35763/97, Judgment, 21 November 2001.
　Ibid., para.66. See also, Report of the Study Group of the ILC (Finalized by Martti 
Koskenniemi), Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (2006), 
at 187-188, para. 373.
　Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervention), 
Judgment of 3 February 2012, ICJ Reports 2012, at 99.
　Ibid., at 140 (para. 93).
　Ibid., at 136, 140-141 (paras. 82, 94).
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alleged ʻoverridingʼ or ʻnon-derogableʼ power.
　This brief overview suggests that the peremptory nature of norms does 
not always achieve the virtually unlimited special effects that they are 
alleged to have, by ʻoverridingʼ or ʻtrumpingʼ all other rules or regimes of 
international law.(91) However deplorable as the act in question might be, jus 
cogens norms do not function as a panacea to remedy all situations of alleged 
injustice. It follows that the mere identification of some rules as having 
peremptory nature is not sufficient to determine what legal consequences 
they may entail.(92) Moreover, this may lead to the negation of the validity 
of deductive approach as such, because drawing practical conclusions 
directly from the jus cogens concept without any need for state practice and 
opinio juris can be seen as a manifestation of the interpreterʼs own 
approach.(93)
　That said, there is still considerable support for the proposition that an 
entitlement of universal jurisdiction over perpetrators of international 
crimes is a logical consequence of the peremptory nature of those crimes. 
This view seems to have gained support not only from doctrinal comments, 
but also from practices of various courts. While some commentators might 
argue that this is merely an achievement of the ordinary customary law-
making process,(94) a further assessment on this point is still warranted, as 
this proposition seems to have been retained for quite some time, 
irrespective of the fact that state practices did not seem to be matured 
enough to confirm customary international law.
　The ICTY seems the most proactive in this respect. In the Prosecutor v. 
Furundžija,(95) the Trial Chamber observed that ʻit would be inconsistent on 
the one hand to prohibit torture to such an extent as to restrict the normally 
　Talmon, supra note 78, at 987-994; J. Vidmar ʻRethinking Jus Cogens after Germany 
v. Italy: Back to Article 53?ʼ, 60 Netherlands International Law Review (2013), at 22.
　C. Focarelli, ʻPromotional Jus Cogens: A Critical Appraisal of Jus Cogensʼ Legal 
Effectsʼ, 77 Nordic Journal of International Law (2008), at 444.
　Ibid., at 446.
　Ibid., at 450. See also, A. Zimmermann ʻViolations of Fundamental Norms of 
International Law and the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction in Criminal Mattersʼ, in C. 
Tomuschat and J.-M. Thouvenin (eds), The Fundamental Rules of the International 
Legal Order (2006), at 339.
　Prosecutor v. Furundžija, IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 10 December 1998.
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unfettered treaty-making power of sovereign States and on the other hand 
bar States from prosecuting and punishing those torturers who have 
engaged in this odious practice abroad [emphasis added]ʼ.(96) Put differently, 
the entitlement of universal jurisdiction can be viewed as a logical 
consequence of the peremptory nature of the prohibition of torture. In the 
Prosecutor v. Tadić,(97) the Appealʼs Chamber of the ICTY was tasked with 
ruling on the plea of sovereign equality raised by the appellant, who alleged 
that no state could assume jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed on the 
territory of another state without any justification by a treaty or customary 
international law.(98) Based on this proposition, the appellant argued that the 
same requirement applied to the exercise of jurisdiction of an international 
tribunal, which suggests the principle of state sovereignty would have been 
violated in that case. The chamber rejected this plea, relying instead on the 
nature of the crime, with explicit reference to the jurisprudence of the 
Eichmann case.(99) According to the court, the primacy of the international 
tribunal over domestic courts can be confirmed with regard to the crime, 
which was ʻuniversal in nature, well recognized in international law as 
serious breaches of international humanitarian law, and transcending the 
interest of any one state [emphasis added]ʼ.(100)
　Similarly, the Special Court for Sierra Leone was faced with the 
challenge to its jurisdiction in the Prosecutor v. Kallon & Kamara,(101) in 
light of the amnesty granted in the Lomé agreement. In rejecting this 
allegation, the court, while admitting that ʻthe grant of amnesty or pardon 
is undoubtedly an exercise of sovereign powerʼ,(102) nevertheless concluded 
that the grant of amnesty would not amount to depriving another state of its 
　Ibid., para.156.
　Prosecutor v. Tadić, IT-94-1-AR 74, Appeals Chamber, Decision on the Defence 
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995.
　Ibid., para. 55.
　The Eichmann case, the Supreme Court of Israel, Judgment of 29 May 1962, 36 
International Law Reporter 277, at 291-93.
　Prosecutor v. Tadić, IT-94-1-AR 74, Appeals Chamber, Decision on the Defence 
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para. 59.
(101)　Prosecutor v. Kallon, SCSL-2004-15-AR 72 (E) (March 13, 2004), and Prosecutor v. 
Kamara, SCSL-2004-16-AR 72 (E) (March 13, 2004), para. 67.
(102)　Ibid., para. 67.
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jurisdiction where it is universal. Whether the crimes are crimes 
susceptible to universal jurisdiction depends on the nature of the crimes. 
Thus, ʻ[o]ne consequence of the nature of grave international crimes 
against humanity is that States can, under international law, exercise 
universal jurisdiction over such crimesʼ.(103)
　Given all this, there seems to be at least a strong indication in the ʻcase 
lawʼ, that international crimes that amount to the violation of jus cogens 
norms may be subject to the assertion of universal jurisdiction. In fact, 
when Lord Brown-Wilkinson stated in Pinochet (No. 3)(104) in the House of 
Lords that ʻ[t]he jus cogens nature of the international crime of torture 
justifies states in taking universal jurisdiction over torture wherever 
committedʼ, he did not feel obliged to make detailed arguments but merely 
referred to Furundžija and Demjanjuk.
　Nevertheless, one may still argue whether this is truly a logical 
consequence of the peremptory nature of these types of crimes. Regarding 
this, it should be noted at the outset that if one takes that view, the 
assertion of universal jurisdiction should be mandatory, rather than merely 
permissive. In fact, this view is premised on the postulation that since those 
offences by their very nature undermine the foundations of the international 
community, individual perpetrators － an addressee of the prohibition of jus 
cogens norms － must not go unpunished; hence, it has a strong overtone of 
retributive justice.(105) Based on this proposition, it argues that offences that 
undermine the international order are the concern of all states; in order for 
the absolute nature of the prohibition to be effectuated, all states must 
(103)　Ibid., para. 70.
(104)　R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte 
(No. 3), [1999] 2 All E.R. 97 (H.L.)
(105)　On the assertion that universal jurisdiction over international crimes should be 
understood as a manifestation of retributive justice, rather than deterrent, see, e.g., 
International Law Association, Final Report on the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction in 
respect of Gross Human Rights Offences (2000), at 3-4.
　　Dissenting Opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert in Arrest Warrant mirrors this idea: 
ʻthe ratio legis of universal jurisdiction is based on the international reprobation for 
certain very serious crimes such as war crimes and crimes against humanity. Its ration 
dʼêtre is to avoid impunity, to prevent suspects of such crimes finding a safe haven in 
third countriesʼ. Case concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11  April 2000, Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert, ICJ Reports 2002, at 166-167 (para. 46).
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cooperate in bringing those perpetrators into justice. Such cooperation 
requires states to either prosecute or extradite perpetrators if they are 
found in their territory; this can be seen as a requirement of mandatory 
universal jurisdiction in the sense that states are obliged to exercise their 
jurisdiction when they do not extradite the alleged offender even if the 
offense does not have any link with the forum state other than the presence of 
that person. In fact, proponents of the deductive approach express support 
for the idea of mandatory universal jurisdiction. For example, Stevens 
impassionedly argues that:
the only way the prohibition of genocide can have any concrete meaning 
as a jus cogens norm － that is, as a rule of paramount importance to the 
maintenance of the international order and from which no derogation is 
allowed － is if this norm is supported by a jus cogens duty to extradite or 
prosecute. The absolute prohibition of genocide has no meaning unless all 
states have an absolute obligation to bring offenders to justiceʼ.(106)
　Orakhelashivili, applying the all-embracing superiority of jus cogens norms, 
concludes that ʻ[i]f jus cogens crimes are peremptorily outlawed as crimes, 
then the duty to prosecute or extradite their perpetrators must be viewed 
as peremptoryʼ.(107) Judge Ferrari Bravo, in his dissenting opinion in 
Al-Adsani, albeit not in the criminal law context, insists that the jus cogens 
nature of the prohibition of torture entails that ʻevery State has a duty to 
contribute to the punishment of tortureʼ.(108)
　The proponents of mandatory universal jurisdiction thus infer the duty to 
prosecute or extradite from the peremptory nature of the prohibition of 
crimes in question. As observed above, there is a growing consensus today 
that certain crimes are established as jus cogens crimes. However, the 
addressee of the peremptory prohibition is individuals, not states. If one 
(106)　L. A. Stevens, ʻGenocide and the Duty to Extradite or Prosecute: Why the United 
States is in Breach of Its International Obligationsʼ, 39 Virginia Journal of International 
Law (1998-1999), at 447-448.
(107)　A. Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law (2006), at 306.
(108)　Al-Adsani v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 35763/97, Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Ferrari Bravo.
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argues that the effect of such a prohibition stretches to states, it would 
amount to situate individuals and states in the same sphere, and argue that 
states would act in complicity with those individual perpetrators by not 
punishing them. Yet it does not seem to match the current legal system of 
international law.
　Admittedly, states may assume an obligation in relation to the acts of 
individuals, but it does not derive from the complicity of states with 
individuals. On the one hand, a state may be held responsible for an act of 
genocide committed by individuals if their conduct is attributable to it. 
However, it is because that states themselves are bound not to commit 
genocide, through the actions of individuals or certain entities whose acts 
are attributable to them.(109) On the other hand, a state is held responsible 
for the violation of the obligation to prevent or punish certain conducts 
committed by individuals under certain circumstances. However, this 
obligation derives from norms that address and regulate statesʼ acts and 
omissions, which are conceptualized distinctly from a conduct of 
individuals.(110) In any event, while there is a growing support among 
doctrines that territorial states and national states of the offender assumes 
an obligation to investigate and prosecute as far as international crimes or 
serious human rights violations are concerned, it does not automatically 
apply to third states.
(109)　Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, 26 February 
2007, ICJ Reports 2007, at 114 (para. 167)
(110)　While the theory of complicity was prevailing in 19th centuryʼs doctrines and 
practices, it was criticized by some modern theorists such as Anzilotti as situating a 
private person and a state in the same sphere. According to them, a state is 
internationally responsible solely for its conduct, and not for that of private persons. 
See D. Anzilotti, ʻLa responsabilité international des états: a raison des dommages 
soufferts par des étrangersʼ, 13 Revue générale de droit international public (1906), at 
13. This was adopted by the General Claims Commission in Janes v. Mexico, where 
the Commission found that ʻ[t]he international delinquency in this case [the failure to 
investigate and prosecute] is one of its own specific type, separate from the private 
delinquency of the culpritʼ. See, Janes v. Mexico, General Claims Commission, Opinion 
and Decision of 16 November 1926, 26 American Journal of International Law (1927), 
at 362-371. The distinction between state responsibility and individual liability 
established in this opinion marked the turning point in the sense that it conceptualized 
the duty to prosecute, which has been adopted by doctrines and practices since then.
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　Hence, the proposition of mandatory universal jurisdiction does not seem 
to have gained enough support to be a mainstream argument. In contrast, 
an examination of international practice shows a strong indication in favour 
of the permissive nature of universal jurisdiction. Above all, those 
statements made in the case law highlighted above typically spoke of 
ʻentitlementʼ or ʻinterestʼ of the assertion of universal jurisdiction, and in 
doing so hints at the permissive nature of universal jurisdiction. In the same 
vein, many instruments adopted by the association of experts employ 
permissive terms when they define the concept of universal jurisdiction.(111) 
Doctrinal statements also conform to this trend.(112)
　In conclusion, the approach that infers the basis of universal jurisdiction 
directly from the peremptory nature of the crimes does not appear to 
provide a feasible explanation for the current state of practice. It is true 
that certain crimes are recognized as jus cogens crimes that directly impose 
obligation upon individuals. It is also true that there is a growing support for 
the idea that those crimes are subject to the assertion of universal 
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the latter proposition cannot be seen as an 
automatic consequence of the former. If one infers the foundation for 
universal jurisdiction from the peremptory nature of the crimes, it suggests 
that one begins from the absolute nature of individual criminal responsibility, 
which would inevitably lead to the argument that individuals must be held 
accountable wherever they are and states must act to hold individuals 
accountable. No considerable support for such an absolute duty of states can 
be found in the current developments with respect to the assertion of 
universal jurisdiction.
(111)　Principle 1-2 of the Princeton Principle on Universal Jurisdiction (2001); Resolution 
3(a) of the Institute adopted in the Krakow Session (2005), available at 
http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/2005_kra_03_en.pdf (as of 31 October 2014); 
The AU-EU Expert Report on the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction (2009), 
8672/1/09 REV1, para. 9.
(112)　L.S. Sunga, Individual Responsibility in International Law for Serious Human Rights 
Violations (1992), at 104; G. Bottini, ʻUniversal Jurisdiction after the Creation of the 
International Criminal Courtʼ, 36 International Law and Politics (2004), at 515; R. 
Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes (2005), at 93.
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2. The Inductive Approach
　2.1. Development of State Practice
　As opposed to the deductive approach, the inductive approach, that is, 
inducing the basis for universal jurisdiction by confirming ordinary customary 
rules, seems to have gained support. This is by no means without reason. 
While the retreat of Belgium and Spain from their spearheading course on 
universal jurisdiction led some commentators to declare the ʻfallʼ(113) or even 
the ʻdeathʼ(114) of universal jurisdiction, there has been a number of 
developments which seem to provide ample evidence for assessing the 
operation universal jurisdiction in the context of customary international 
law.
　For instance, a growing number of states have adopted legislation that 
empowers their courts to exercise universal jurisdiction over core crimes. 
According to the Amnesty Internationalʼs survey of national legislation 
published in 2012, 147 (approximately 76.2ｵ) out of 193 UN member 
states have made provisions for universal jurisdiction over one or more of 
ʻcrimes under international lawʼ (war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
genocide and torture), and 16 (approximately 8.29ｵ) out of 193 states can 
exercise universal jurisdiction over conduct that amounts to a crime under 
international law, albeit only as an ordinary crime. The survey concludes 
that a total of 163 states (approximately 84.46ｵ) can exercise universal 
jurisdiction over one or more crimes under international law.(115) It is 
important to note that the list includes many African states, which have 
been known for their critical attitude towards the assertion of universal 
jurisdiction.
　Moreover, criminal proceedings have actually started in some states. For 
instance, in R. v. Munyaneza(116), Quebec Superior Court found Munyaneza 
(113)　L. Reydams, ʻThe Rise and Fall of Universal Jurisdictionʼ, in W. Schabas and N. 
Bernaz (eds), Handbook of International Criminal Law (2011), at 337.
(114)　S. R. Ratner, ʻBelgiumʼs War Crimes Statute: A Postmortemʼ, 97 American Journal 
of International Law (2003), at 888.
(115)　Amnesty International, Universal Jurisdiction: A Preliminary Survey of Legislation 
Around the World － 2012 Update (2012), Index Number: 53/019/2012, at 2.
(116)　R. v. Munyaneza, 2009 QCCS 2201, Quebec Superior Court, Decision of 22 May 2009. 
available at http://www.canlii.org/en/qc/qccs/doc/2009/2009qccs2201/2009qccs2201.
html (as of 31 October 2014)
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guilty of the seven counts of genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes. It was the first time that a Canadian court convicted a person of 
such crimes in the exercise of universal jurisdiction. It was also the first 
prosecution under Canadaʼs Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes 
Act(117) in order to implement the Rome Statute. In Germany, the trial of 
two Rwandan Hutu leaders accused of masterminding atrocities in eastern 
Democratic Republic of Congo started in Stuttgart in 2011.(118) It was the 
first prosecution under the Code of Crimes against International Law 
adopted in June 2002.(119) Likewise, in 2012, a South African court ordered 
the national police and prosecutor to open an investigation based on universal 
jurisdiction of allegations of torture by Zimbabwean security officials.(120)
　Along with those national legislation and judicial practices, many states 
have made declarations in favour of universal jurisdiction. Of particular 
importance are those that were made during a debate of the General 
Assemblyʼs Sixth Committee on the agenda of the scope and application of 
the principle of universal jurisdiction. Overall, it has been generally 
acknowledged that universal jurisdiction is enshrined in international law(121) 
and/or an important tool for the fight against impunity, while concerns has 
been constantly raised on the possibility of its abusive use.
　However, a closer look at those practices leads one to question to what 
extent and in what sense it can be said that universal jurisdiction has been 
established. With regard to national legislation, the same survey of Amnesty 
International reveals that while at least 136 (approximately 70.5ｵ) UN 
member states have made provisions for universal jurisdiction over war 
(117)　S.C. 2000, c. 24.
(118)　For a brief description of the proceedings in this case, see Trial Watch, Ignace 
Murwanashyaka, available at http://www.trial-ch.org/en/resources/trial-watch/trial-
watch/profiles/profile/1025/action/show/controller/Profile/tab/fact.html (as of 31 
October 2014)
(119)　Völkerstrafgesetzbuch (VStGB). 2002, Bundesgesetzblatt (BGB1) Teil I, at 2254. 
For a brief overview of this code, see S. Wirth, ʻGermanyʼs New International Crimes 
Code: Bringing a Case to Courtʼ, 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2003), at 
152-160.
(120)　Southern African Litigation Centre v. National Director of Public Prosecutions, Case 
Number: 77150/0, Judgment of 8 May 2012.
(121)　Australia (UN Doc. A/C.6/66/SR.12, paras. 6-8)(on behalf of CANZ); Canada, 
(UN Doc. A/C.6/65/SR.10, paras. 63-67) (on behalf of CANZ);
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crimes, the number drops to 80 (approximately 41.5ｵ) for crimes against 
humanity, 94 (approximately 48.7ｵ) for genocide and 85 (approximately 
44ｵ) for torture.(122) Moreover, it should be noted that most of the states 
that have already provided for universal jurisdiction over war crimes and 
torture are also parties to the Geneva Conventions and the Convention 
Against Torture, both of which require state parties to establish universal 
jurisdiction. While the ICJ mentioned in the North Sea Continental Shelf 
case the possibility that ʻa very widespread and representative participation 
in the conventionʼ(123) might transform a conventional rule into a rule of 
customary international law, this fact makes it difficult to characterise the 
enactment of these national statutes as a practice that in and of itself 
creates customary international law. In fact, enactment is generally 
regarded as an implementation of treaty obligation rather than an acting out 
of opinio juris sive necessitatis. In any event, those figures are far from 
being capable of generating customary international law in the first place. 
Rather, they merely reveal a deplorable fact of non-compliance with relevant 
treaties, particularly when one recalls that the number of contracting state 
parties had amounted to more than 190 for the Geneva Conventions and 
more than 150 for the Convention Against Torture at the time of the survey.
　The same applies to judicial practices. Apart from the fact that the 
number of proceedings is still limited compared to that of legislation, many 
proceedings have been conducted to carry out treaty obligations, as observed 
in the trial of Hissène Habré in Senegal.(124)
　With regard to state declarations, while considerable support has been 
given to the idea of universal jurisdiction as an ʻimportant toolʼ,(125) ʻeffective 
(122)　Amnesty International, supra note 115, at 12-13.
(123)　North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark/The 
Netherlands), Judgment, 20 February 1969, ICJ Reports 1969, at 43 (para. 73).
(124)　Actually, it can be seen not only as a performance of treaty obligation but also partly 
as a response to the judgment of the ICJ that required Senegal to submit the case, 
without further delay, to its competent authority for prosecution as a remedy to its 
breach of the obligation under the Convention. Questions Relating to the Obligation to 
Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, 20 July 2012, at 463 
(operative paragraph (6)).
(125)　Czech Republic (UN Doc. A/C.6/65/SR.11, paras. 16-17), Netherlands (UN Doc. 
A/C.6/66/SR.13, paras. 46-47).
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instrumentʼ, or ʻ[essential] mechanismʼ(126) for the fight against impunity, 
emphasis has often been made as to the absence of a common understanding 
with regard to the scope, definition, and condition for the application of 
universal jurisdiction.(127) Moreover, describing universal jurisdiction as a 
ʻtoolʼ, ʻinstrumentʼ or ʻmechanismʼ in itself renders its legal status rather 
ambiguous.
　2.2. Efforts to ʻMitigateʼ the Scarcity of State Practice
　On balance, it can be pointed out that uncertainty remains as to the 
scope, application, and conditions for the exercise of universal jurisdiction 
as far as its customary law status is concerned, despite the fact that there 
is a growing support for the idea of universal jurisdiction as a tool for the 
fight against impunity. For the purpose of this study, there is no need to 
determine at this stage whether and to what extent universal jurisdiction is 
established in customary international law. Rather, it may be sufficient to 
observe how commentators evaluate the current state of affairs.
　Some commentators have taken a strict approach in which only a 
considerable amount of state practice and opinio juris can be counted as 
factors generating customary international law. These commentators 
suggest that only national legislation and judicial practices, and/or state 
declarations made as official statements, may be relevant. They suggest 
that the practice of international criminal courts may not be counted, on the 
grounds that that their development was precisely in order to provide a 
remedy for the deficiencies of national courts.(128) Those commentators tend 
to deny the customary status of universal jurisdiction, observing that ʻthe 
evidence of state practice on this matter is not yet substantial so as to afford 
the finding of a customary international law rule in its favourʼ,(129) or that 
ʻ[such category of jurisdiction] is unknown to international lawʼ.(130)
(126)　Democratic Republic of the Congo, (UN Doc. A/C.6/65/SR.11, paras. 29-31)
(127)　Thailand (UN Doc. A/C.6/65/SR.11, paras. 11-12); UK (UN Doc. A/C.6/66/
SR.13, paras. 24-26) (arguing that universal jurisdiction is clearly established only for 
piracy, war crimes, there being no consensus on genocide and crime against humanity)
(128)　Cf. Case concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11  April 2000, Opinion individuelle de M. 
Guillaume, président, ICJ Reports 2002, at 40 (para. 11).
(129)　S. Yee, ʻUniversal Jurisdiction: Concept, Logic and Realityʼ, 10 Chinese Journal of 
International Law (2011), at 529-530.
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　Other commentators have taken a more lenient approach, which in many 
cases results in the affirmation of a right of universal jurisdiction under 
customary international law. There are mainly two distinct strands for this 
perspective.
　The first strand argues that a smaller amount of practice is sufficient to 
establish a right to exercise universal jurisdiction, as distinguished from a 
duty to do so. This has the effect of mitigating the requirement for the 
establishment of customary law. Premised on this view, Cryer concludes 
that ʻincreasing supportʼ for the assertion of universal jurisdiction by states 
is sufficient to suggest that the customary case for universal jurisdiction 
over core crimes may be made, and, with some caution, the same 
conclusion can be made with regard to universal jurisdiction in absentia.(131) 
In this regard, reference can also be made to the joint separate opinion of 
Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, in the Arrest Warrant case, 
which Cryer explicitly relies on. While admitting an apparent lack of 
evidence to support the status of universal jurisdiction in absentia, the 
judges concluded that ʻthere is no rule of international law ... which makes 
illegal co-operative acts designed to secure the presence within a State 
wishing exercise jurisdiction [in this case, co-operative acts denote a 
request of extradition in the application of universal principle, which is seen 
as the exercise of universal jurisdiction in absentia]ʼ.(132) While this statement 
in itself can be criticized as being premised on an erroneous distinction 
between universal jurisdiction in general and universal jurisdiction in 
absentia, it is still worth noting because it appears to apply a less strict 
condition － the absence of prohibition which could be confirmed more easily 
than the establishment of right － in affirming universal jurisdiction in 
absentia.
　While being in line with the mainstream argument that universal 
(130)　Case concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11  April 2000, ICJ Reports 2002, Opinion 
individuelle de M. Guillaume, président, ICJ Reports 2002, at 44 (para. 12).This 
statement was made with regard to universal jurisdiction in absentia, though. See also, 
L. Reydams, Universal Jurisdiction (2003), at 224.
(131)　Cryer, supra note 112, at 89-94.
(132)　Case concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11  April 2000, Joint Separate Opinion of 
Judges Higgins, Buergenthal and Kooijmans, ICJ Reports 2002, at 80 (para. 58).
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jurisdiction over core crimes is permissive and not mandatory, this view 
cannot be entirely free from criticism. First of all, it raises the question of 
why an establishment of right can be treated differently from that of duty: 
A right entails that someone else has a duty to ensure the state of affairs 
envisaged by that right to be brought about.(133) In other words, the 
creation of a right entails the creation of a corresponding duty. It follows 
that, normally, the conditions for the establishment of right should be as 
strict as that of duty. Moreover, this view seems self-contradictory: on the 
one hand, it is premised on that the ground of jurisdiction must be 
established under international law, thereby rejecting the Lotus 
presumption,(134) which they regard as denoting that what is not explicitly 
prohibited is permitted(135); on the other, it infers, at least presumptively, 
the existence of right from the absence of prohibition, thereby implicitly 
endorsing the same Lotus presumption.
　In contrast, the second strand of reasoning broadens the scope of 
ʻpracticeʼ to be considered, thereby making it easier to affirm the customary 
status of universal jurisdiction without a large amount of state practice lato 
sensu. Conveying a strong overtone of ʻmodern positivismʼ,(136) this view 
attaches significant weight to ʻverbalʼ state practice, along with ʻhardʼ state 
practice, and deduces detailed rules from general principles.(137) In his 
influential article, Kreß draws attention to the Preamble of the ICC Statue 
(133)　W. N. Hohfeld, ʻSome Fundamental Legal Conception as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoningʼ, 23 Yale Law Journal (1913), at 32-44.
(134)　The Case of the S.S. ʻLotusʼ (France v. Turkey), PCIJ Series A, No.10, at 19.
(135)　In fact, Lotus presumption has been regarded as reflecting a ʻhigh water mark of 
laissez-faire in international relationsʼ resting upon the principle of sovereignty and 
consent, and commentators maintain that it has not survived the substantive changes 
that international society has achieved since then. Case concerning the Arrest Warrant 
of 11  April 2000, Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Buergenthal and 
Kooijmans, ICJ Reports 2002, 78 (para. 51); Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad hoc van 
den Wyngaert, ibid., 169 (para. 51). See also, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, Declaration de president Bedjaoui, ICJ Reports 1996, 270-271 (para. 13); 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, ibid., 394-396.
(136)　B. Simma and A. L. Paulus, ʻThe Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights 
Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A Positivist Viewʼ, 93 American Journal of International 
Law (1999), at 306-308.
(137)　On the deduction of concrete rules from general principles, see, Simma and Alston, 
supra note 54, at 102-106.
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in which states solemnly declare that such crimes ʻmust not go unpunishedʼ 
and that ʻtheir effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at 
the national levelʼ.(138) States have thus expressed ʻtheir wish to see 
international criminal law regularly enforcedʼ, with regard to crime under 
international law.(139) Postulating this necessity for the routine enforcement 
of international criminal law as a goal of the emerging system of 
international criminal justice for which universal jurisdiction plays a part, he 
concludes:
...the categorization by states of conduct as a crime under international 
law must, for reasons of principles and consistency, be seen as a strong 
indication in favour of a customary state competence to exercise universal 
jurisdiction. Accordingly, the same amount of precise and ʻhardʼ state 
practice demanded by the Continental Shelf test may not be necessary to 
affirm the existence of a permissive international legal rule in this case.(140)
The merits of this view lies in that it may offer a way for integrating 
various ʻverbalʼ state practices that are generally made in relation to 
concluding treaties (conclusion of treaties, voting records, and expression 
of statesʼ wish in the preamble) or other proclamations made in international 
fora on customary international law, thereby capturing or catching up the 
trend that is changing rapidly today. This method seems to be particularly 
promising for the field of international criminal law, because international 
criminalization takes place at international level, which, as was shown above, 
has been taking a different path from an ordinary customary law creation.(141)
　However, this approach nevertheless raises some problems. If states 
truly wish to see the regular enforcement of international criminal law, in 
the sense that individual perpetrators are held accountable wherever they 
are, the exercise of universal jurisdiction must be mandatory, not merely 
permissive. In fact, the Preamble of the ICC Statute speaks of ʻthe duty of 
(138)　All citation are from the fourth preamblar paragraph of the Statute of the ICC.
(139)　C. Kreß, ʻUniversal Jurisdiction over International Crimes and the Institut de Droit 
internationalʼ, 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2006), at 574.
(140)　Ibid., at 575.
(141)　Simma and Alston, supra note 54, at 308-316. See also, Kreß, ibid., at 571-572.
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every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for 
international crimes [emphasis added]ʼ,(142) although jurisdiction here is not 
necessarily means universal jurisdiction. However, universal jurisdiction has 
been constantly conceived as permissive, as far as its customary status is 
concerned. Moreover, as Amnesty Internationalʼs figures (cited above) 
demonstrate, not all states are willing to provide universal jurisdiction over 
all crimes under international law: verbal state practice is contradicted by 
material state practice. It may be argued that the modern positivist 
approach functions at the level of international criminalization, but not at the 
level of its national enforcement.(143) In this regard, the application of 
modern positivism to universal jurisdiction seems to share the same 
problems with the deduction of universal jurisdiction from jus cogens 
prohibition. Whether relying on jus cogens prohibition or verbal state 
practice, there is little doubt today that individual criminal responsibility is 
established over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. 
However, this fact, or the method that is applied to establish individual 
criminal responsibility, does not necessarily apply to or affect the national 
enforcement of those prohibitions.
Concluding Remarks
　Overall, the deductive approach and the inductive approach each have 
their own significance and problems. It can be noted that both of approaches 
agree that individuals are held responsible directly under international law 
with regard to ʻcrimes under international lawʼ, and there should be no 
impunity for the individual perpetrators of those crimes, for which universal 
jurisdiction may play a part. Simultaneously, state practices that provide 
universal jurisdiction over those crimes are apparently not sufficient or 
coherent enough to establish customary rules in light of the strict conditions 
(142)　Citation is from the sixth preamblar paragraph of the Statute of the ICC.
(143)　Admittedly, Kreß is explicitly aware of this distinction, when he argues: ʻIt is not 
necessarily inconsistent for states, on the one hand, to pronounce themselves in favour 
of the international criminalization of certain conduct because such conduct if of 
ʻconcern to the international community as a wholeʼ, and on the other hand, to deny a 
stateʼs competence to exercise universal jurisdiction over such a crime [citation 
omitted]ʼ. 
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demanded by the Continental Shelf test.
　Against this backdrop, doctrines have sought to overcome this apparent 
deficiency in one way or another, thereby establishing the ground of 
universal jurisdiction in order to meet the need of the fight against 
impunity. On the one hand, the deductive approach (especially in the 
context of the jus cogens doctrine) puts emphasis on the absolute nature of 
individual responsibility from which the ground of universal jurisdiction can 
be deduced, thereby eliminating the need to rely on state practice or opinio 
juris. While this view may capture the reality of those crimes being 
increasingly condemned as the violation of jus cogens rules, it has its own 
drawbacks. In order for this approach to retain a logical coherency, 
universal jurisdiction must be structured as a duty, not a right. However, 
this is not observed in the current context. On the other hand, the 
inductive approach tries to mitigate the strict conditions for the establishment 
of customary international law, thereby confirming the ground of universal 
jurisdiction. This approach may provide a description of how those conditions 
are mitigated, but does not seem to provide a persuasive explanation for the 
question of why these conditions can be mitigated in those cases.
　Somewhat paradoxically, it can be argued that the problem lies not 
necessarily in methodology, but to the conception of jurisdiction. Both 
approaches are, at least implicitly, premised on that the basis for universal 
jurisdiction must be provided by permissive rules of international law, 
because jurisdictional claims without linkage to a crime is an excessive claim 
that constitutes interference with the domestic matters of territorial state or 
national state of the offender. That is why the deductive approach makes 
recourse to the peremptory nature of crimes, which allegedly is vested with 
a power to transcend sovereignty. That is also the reason why the inductive 
approach seeks to mitigate the conditions for the establishment of 
customary international law, based on the understanding that the ground of 
universal jurisdiction must be established in international law that governs 
relations between states.
　However, it can be argued that that very premise should be questioned. 
In fact, it is quite unlikely － if not unthinkable － that the application of 
criminal law to conduct that occurred in the territory of another state 
constitutes a violation of the principle of non-interference.
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　First of all, a stateʼs law ordinarily prescribes acts of individuals, not of 
states, and its application does not compel a state to do or not do certain 
acts.
　On the other hand, some may still argue that by attaching legal 
consequences to conduct in another state, a state exercises control over that 
conduct, which may constitute an interference with the sovereign rights of 
that foreign state, when such control affects the latterʼs essential interest.(144)
　While this view may fit in the field of economic law, things may not be 
the same in the field of criminal law. In the field of criminal law, it is only 
the state that holds the alleged perpetrator in custody that can effectively 
enforce its law. Accordingly, a prescriptive statement in itself would not 
affect individualsʼ behaviour, in so far as they remain within the territorial 
bounds of another state. Admittedly, the possibility that individuals may be 
subject to territorial enforcement after they enter into the proscribing state, 
may induce compliance with that law, or deter them from traveling to that 
state. In the former case, their behaviour could be regarded as a violation 
of their home countryʼs law. If it is an isolated case, which is very likely in 
the case of criminal law, it would hardly constitute a threat to that local 
state. In the latter case, the possibility of territorial enforcement may be 
perceived as a restraint on their freedom to move (not a right, as individuals 
do not have a right to enter foreign territories in general). However, it 
would not be a matter of international law, unless the individual in question 
enjoys immunity as a state official, which is not an instance that involves the 
principle of non-interference. For instance, in the Arrest Warrant case, the 
ICJ held that Belgiumʼs international circulation of arrest warrant might 
have affected Yerodiaʼs capacity to undertake travel in the performance of 
his duties as an incumbent foreign minister, thereby constituting a violation 
of an obligation of Belgium towards the Congo. However, it was the 
infringement of the immunity of incumbent foreign minister from criminal 
jurisdiction and the inviolability enjoyed by him under international law and 
not the principle of non-intervention that was at stake.(145)
(144)　D. J. Gerber, ʻBeyond Balancing: International Law Restraints on the Reach of 
National Laws,ʼ 10 Yale Journal of International Law (1984-1985), at 212.
(145)　Arrest Warrant of 11  April 2000  (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium), ICJ 
Reports 2002, Judgment, 20 July 2012, at 30 (para. 71).
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　To sum up, the prescription of foreignerʼs conduct taking place in the 
territory of another state dose not, in itself, constitute interference with the 
domestic matters of the territorial or national state of the offender. To 
expand on this, the ground of universal jurisdiction does not need to be 
established under international law in order for it to be justified vis-à-vis 
territorial or national states. Put differently, a state may exercise universal 
prescriptive jurisdiction without violating other statesʼ rights under inter-
national law.
　A stateʼs ability to exercise universal prescriptive jurisdiction without 
violating another stateʼs rights, however, does not mean that a state has a 
right to prescribe conduct that takes place within the territory of another 
state, at least not in the sense that the latter has a corresponding duty to 
accept or at least acquiesce to such a prescription from an outside state. 
Rather, it means that international law is simply neutral on this point. Nor 
can the prescribing state always achieve the objective of such extraterritorial 
prescription. In fact, while territorial jurisdiction does not make other 
statesʼ extraterritorial prescriptions illegal, it still functions as a de facto 
restraint upon other statesʼ assertion of jurisdiction. Because states are 
generally prohibited from enforcing their law within the territory of other 
states, prescribing states cannot exercise their jurisdiction effectively 
without the cooperation of territorial states in collecting evidence and 
obtaining custody of individual perpetrators.
　Moreover, the rights of accused individuals also constitute a restraint on 
statesʼ extraterritorial application of criminal law. In the case of 
extraterritorial application of criminal law, the accused are not subject to 
the public authority of the asserting state ― unless, of course, they are 
nationals of that state ― and hence they are not expected to have 
knowledge about the criminal law in that forum. This appears to be 
incompatible with the requirement of the specificity of criminal rules under 
the principle of legality, which is a substantive restraint on the authority of 
a state to impose punishment upon individuals.
　This apparent discrepancy leads us to the need for a thorough review of 
the system of jurisdiction in general and universal jurisdiction in particular. 
While existing approaches seek to establish an entitlement to jurisdictional 
claims, the above observation suggests that the question should be instead 
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what sort of restraints jurisdictional claims are subject to and if and how 
international law is relevant in removing or easing such restraints. It is in 
light of those restraints that a new approach of universal jurisdiction should 
be sought.
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